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COMMON LAW EVIDENCE AND THE COMMON LAW OF
HUMAN RIGHTS: TOWARDS A HARMONIC CONVERGENCE?
John D. Jackson*

ABSTRACT
This Article considers the impact which European Human Rights Law has made
upon the common law rules of evidence with reference to the approach the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has adopted towards exclusionary rules of evidence. Particular attention will be given to rules that have been developed by the
ECtHR in relation to the right to counsel during police questioning (the so-called
“Salduz” doctrine) and the right to examine witnesses (the so-called “sole or decisive” evidence rule). The Article argues that the effect of these rules has encouraged
common law judges to engage more holistically with the effect of certain kinds of
evidence on both the weight of the evidence as a whole and on the fairness of the
proceedings as a whole. The result has been to encourage a shift in the nature of
both their epistemic and non-epistemic reasoning during the trial. In its most recent
decisions, however, the Court appears to have drawn back from its more activist
stance of setting standards of fair participation in evidentiary matters. Instead, the
Court has become more fixated on the traditional common law concern with reliability. This has somewhat pushed back the potential that the ECtHR has to shift the
common law toward reaching a more harmonic convergence between achieving
truth and fairness in criminal proceedings.
INTRODUCTION
This Article considers what impact Human Rights Law has made on the common law of evidence, developed in common law jurisdictions as a discrete body of
law and practice with a particular focus on exclusionary rules of evidence. Particular
emphasis will be given to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) which this Article argues has tried to steer an uneasy path between two
positions. The first position is one of minimal interference toward the way in which
evidence is regulated in member states. This position proceeds on the basis that as
an international court, the ECtHR must respect the traditions of member states, and
* School of Law, University of Nottingham. Early versions of this Article were presented
at the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal Symposium entitled Right Protection in International Criminal Law and Beyond, March 16–17, 2018, and at the Evidential Reasoning
World Conference at the University of Girona, June 6–8, 2018. I am grateful to participants
at each of these events for their comments.
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that those member states should be the driving force in the matter of applying the
European Convention on Human Rights. This has resulted in the Court taking a back
seat, arbitrating on application of the fair-trial principles in individual cases, and
intervening only when the result of a case has led to an unfair outcome. The second
position is to take a more supervisory position of “director of operations,” ensuring
that the right to a fair trial and the rights of the defense are made sufficiently “practical and effective” within the member states.1 It will be suggested that in its early
days the Court gravitated in favor of the first approach, but in more recent times it
has moved toward the second approach. In particular, it has developed certain rules
that have had the effect of encouraging common law judges to engage more holistically with the effect of certain kinds of evidence on the weight of the evidence as a
whole and on the fairness of the proceedings as a whole. The effect has encouraged
a shift in the nature of both their epistemic and non-epistemic reasoning during the
trial. In its more recent decisions, however, the Court appears to have drawn back
from its activist stance of setting standards of fair participation in evidentiary
matters and has become more fixated on the traditional common law concern with
reliability. This has arguably pushed back the potential of the ECtHR to shift the
common law toward reaching a more harmonic convergence between achieving
truth and fairness in criminal proceedings.
Part I of the Article identifies two distinct characteristics of the common law
model of Evidence Law: the exclusionary nature and unitary effect of the rules of
evidence. Although the aim of many of these rules has been to promote accurate fact
finding, this is achieved by judges filtering out certain classes of unreliable evidence
on an atomistic, piecemeal basis, without considering the impact of these items of
evidence on the case as a whole. The focus on excluding certain types of unreliable
evidence in criminal and civil cases alike has meant that little attention was paid to
issues of procedural fairness in criminal proceedings. This Part ends by illustrating
how common law judges have increasingly had to engage in “forensic reasoning
rules” and developing protective rights for accused persons.
Part II then examines the approach that the ECtHR has adopted toward rules of
evidence and traces a growing activism in this respect as the Court has developed
its own directive standards of procedural fairness based on fair participation. Two
particular rules developed by the ECtHR will be considered which exemplify the
second more activist approach: the so-called Salduz doctrine and the so-called “sole
or decisive” rule applied to unexamined statements. The Salduz doctrine is a kind
of European “Miranda” rule whereby access to a lawyer should be provided from
the first police interrogation of a suspect. Any use of incriminating statements at trial
which have been made during police interrogation without such access will, in
1

Robert Spano, Terrorism and Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights—
Ibrahim and Others v. United Kingdom (2016) (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.nottingham.ac
.uk/hrlc/documents/specialevents/judge-spano-lecture-report.pdf [http://perma.cc/AW38-6F7C].
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principle, irretrievably prejudice the rights of the defense.2 The “sole or decisive”
rule provides that defense rights are unduly restricted if the conviction of a defendant
is solely, or mainly, based on evidence provided by witnesses whom the accused is
unable to examine at any stage of the proceedings.3
This Article then proceeds to examine what effect these rules have had on the
common law model of Evidence Law. Part III examines how the “sole or decisive”
rule in particular has encouraged common law judges to take a more holistic approach in their assessment of evidence. Part IV considers how the rules require judges
to give greater weight to considerations of fairness and to elevate considerations of
fair participation in the proceedings above the traditional considerations of truthfinding. Part V, however, argues that in its most recent decisions, the ECtHR appears
to have pulled back from its more activist stance of setting standards of fairness in
evidentiary matters and has instead become more fixated on the traditional common
law concern with reliability. This has somewhat pushed back the potential the ECtHR
has to shift the common law toward achieving a more harmonic convergence between achieving truth and fairness in criminal proceedings. This Article concludes,
somewhat more positively, by arguing that certain aspects of recent decisions reflect
the Court’s determination to ensure that member states give due consideration to the
principles of fair participation and the rule of law.
I. THE COMMON LAW MODEL OF EVIDENCE LAW
For many centuries, evidence has been regulated in common law countries by
a law of evidence which is often contrasted with a “free” system of proof that operates
in civil law countries. The core of this contrast is sometimes wrongly attributed to
the fact that common law systems have rules of evidence while civil law systems do
not.4 In fact, “contemporary Continental procedural systems place a variety of constraints on the . . . use of certain types of evidence similar, in many respects, to
evidentiary devices and doctrines familiar to common lawyers.”5 The common law
system is, however, distinctive in two important respects: first, in its exclusionary
nature and, secondly, in its unified effect.6 J. B. Thayer, one of the giants of AngloAmerican common law scholarship, viewed the common law system as “radically
2

See Salduz v. Turkey, 2008-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 59, 61–62. For an exposition of the relationship between Miranda’s rule and the Salduz doctrine, see Charles D. Weisselberg, Exporting
and Importing Miranda, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1235 (2017).
3
See Al-Khawaja v. United Kingdom (Al-Khawaja II), 2011-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 191, 253–54.
4
See JOHN D. JACKSON & SARAH J. SUMMERS, THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE: BEYOND THE COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW TRADITIONS 30 (2012).
5
John Jackson & Paul Roberts, Beyond Common Law Evidence: Reimagining, and Reinvigorating, Evidence Law as Forensic Science, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL PROCESS
788 (Darryl K. Brown, Jenia Iontcheva Turner & Bettina Weisser eds., 2019) (forthcoming
March 2019).
6
Id. at 788, 793.
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peculiar” because “a great mass of evidential matter, logically important and probative,
is shut out from the view of the judicial tribunals by an imperative rule, while the
same matter is not thus excluded anywhere else.”7 He predicated common law evidence on two strikingly simple, complementary principles: “(1) that nothing is to be
received which is not logically probative of some matter requiring . . . pro[of]; and
(2) that everything which is thus probative should” be received unless excluded by
some rule or principle of law.8 The effect is to disaggregate the law of evidence from
the logic of proof by excluding from the fact-finding arena certain kinds of evidence,
even though such evidence is ex hypothesi relevant. As Thayer put it, “[t]he law has
no mandamus to the logical faculty.”9 This approach is made particularly effective
by a binary trial structure with a judge capable of ruling on questions of admissibility and capable of excluding evidence from the jury. The structure of continental
proceedings, by contrast, makes it difficult to enforce a system of exclusionary rules
in a context where all of the evidence is heard by the fact-finding tribunal.
It would be wrong to conclude from this that the common law system of evidence is not concerned with truth-finding; far from it. In his intellectual history of
common law evidence scholarship, William Twining considered that there was a
shared assumption that the essential purpose of adjudication is “rectitude of decision.”10 John Henry Wigmore, Thayer’s pupil and another giant of common law
evidence scholarship, divided the rules of evidence into two types: rules of extrinsic
policy and rules of auxiliary probative policy.11 The former promoted values extrinsic
to the forensic process such as various testimonial privileges that allow witnesses
to suppress certain kinds of information to promote values that impose a side-constraint on the core institutional value of promotion of accuracy.12 The latter, such as
the hearsay rule and the rules excluding bad character evidence, are designed to
promote rectitude of outcome by excluding evidence on the ground that it is potentially unreliable or might otherwise unduly prejudice or confuse a jury.13 These latter
types of rules are a distinctive feature of the common law model. While extrinsic
exclusionary rules designed to protect other values not necessarily (or primarily)
connected to the pursuit of truth are quite common in continental legal systems,
“[i]ntrinsic exclusionary rules, which exist primarily to enhance the accuracy of fact
finding” are rare.14 Judges are expected to evaluate the evidence to guarantee the
7
JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON
LAW 1–2 (1898).
8
Id. at 530.
9
Id. at 313–14 n.1.
10
WILLIAM TWINING, The Rationalist Tradition of Evidence Scholarship, in RETHINKING
EVIDENCE 35, 77 (2d ed. 2006) (referencing a principle of Jeremy Bentham).
11
1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW 37–38 (1904).
12
JACKSON & SUMMERS, supra note 4, at 37.
13
See id.
14
See id. at 71.
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accuracy of the verdict, unencumbered by rules requiring them to disregard evidence.15 On the other hand, the common law model, as traditionally conceived, aims
to enhance accuracy by excluding whole classes of evidence from the fact-finder—
the jury—rather than by rules specifying how particular evidence should be evaluated.16
Judges, therefore, are discouraged from engaging in an inferential reasoning process
with the evidence as a whole. Instead they are required to engage in an “atomistic”
approach whereby evidence is assessed piece by piece by reference to two dominant
questions—is it relevant? (a question of logic and proof ) and, if so, is it admissible?
(a question of whether it is excluded by means of an exclusionary rule).17
We have deconstructed the idea that the logic of proof can be disaggregated
from the law of evidence elsewhere.18 Some of the most prominent rules of evidence,
such as the rules on hearsay and bad character evidence, do not in fact depend upon
simply labelling a piece of evidence as “hearsay” or “bad character” but actually require an inferential task to be carried out.19 Whether evidence is hearsay depends upon
what inferences are to be drawn from the evidence—whether, in particular, it is to
be used for a hearsay purpose, namely to prove the truth of any statement asserted
out of court.20 Again, whether bad character evidence is to be excluded depends on
whether the bad character evidence is going to be used inferentially as proof of a
criminal propensity to commit the offense charged.21 While judges are necessarily
engaging in inferential reasoning in applying these rules, this becomes much more
obviously the case when, as over the course of the last century, they have increasingly come to exercise greater discretion over the admissibility of evidence. This
requires them to assess probative force or weight against competing considerations
such as the prejudice the evidence may have on the minds of the jury.22
Commentators have discerned a “powerful trend” toward expanding judicial discretion.23 One sees this in the most recent legislative attempts in the United Kingdom
to regulate hearsay evidence by giving judges an overriding discretion to admit probative hearsay in the interests of justice.24 It is true that some modern legislation, at
15

See id.
Id. at 32.
17
Id. at 42–43.
18
See generally Jackson & Roberts, supra note 5, at 806–10 (discussing the “logic of inference” and the expansion of evidence to encompass inferential reasoning by including
multidisciplinary strands of analysis).
19
See id. at 799.
20
See id. at 798–99.
21
See id. at 799.
22
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403 (permitting judges to exclude “evidence if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading
the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence”).
23
See, e.g., Eleanor Swift, One Hundred Years of Evidence Law Reform: Thayer’s Triumph,
88 CALIF. L. REV. 2437, 2441 (2000).
24
See Criminal Justice Act 2003, c. 44, §§ 114(1)(d)–(2) (Eng.).
16
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least in the UK context, has narrowed judicial discretion—for example, in the crossexamination of complainants on previous sexual history,25 although this has been
interpreted as requiring judges to balance a strict exclusionary approach against the
need to ensure that defendants are not prejudiced by the exclusion of the evidence.26
This clear trend away from strict admissibility rules is also driving judges closer to engaging in inferential reasoning when directing juries on how to evaluate potentially
suspect kinds of evidence that juries would never previously have been exposed to.27
This is what Roberts and Zuckerman have described as “forensic reasoning rules.”28
In the UK, judicial directions must now be given on how to approach drawing
inferences against silence, or probative hearsay, or bad character evidence that has
been admitted by virtue of increasingly relaxed admissibility rules or increasing
judicial inclusionary discretion.29 One should not overstate the effect of this increasing convergence between inferential reasoning and legal doctrine. Once the evidence
is filtered through to the jury, it is still remarkably free to engage in its own common
sense reasoning with little appellate supervision of its processes.30
The second distinctive feature of the common law model of evidence is that it
is unitary in its effect. The rules of admissibility are applied in an undifferentiated
manner to both civil and criminal proceedings.31 It is true that different standards of
proof apply in civil and criminal cases as it is accepted that the risk of error should
not be distributed equally between the parties in a criminal case where the consequences of a wrongful conviction are particularly harmful for the defendant.32 But
the common law model has been—traditionally—remarkably resistant to the idea
that other evidentiary rules need to be calibrated differently according to the procedural context. The view taken regarding rules designed to promote accuracy is that
if certain types of evidence are not reliable, then, they should not be admitted, irrespective of the procedural context and of which party is seeking to adduce them.33
While this approach may be a sound prescription in civil cases where all litigants are
subject to the same procedural standards, it pays little regard to the context of
criminal procedure where one party—the state—is in a very different position from
the other party, and many features of criminal adjudication are applied asymmetrically in favor of the defense.34
25

See Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, c. 23, § 41 (Eng.).
See R v. A (No. 2) [2001] UKHL 25, [2002] 1 AC 45 at 105.
27
PAUL ROBERTS & ADRIAN ZUCKERMAN, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 676–84 (2d ed. 2010).
28
Id.
29
See id.
30
See JOHN D. JACKSON, Unbecoming Jurors and Unreasoned Verdicts: Realising
Integrity in the Jury Room, in THE INTEGRITY OF CRIMINAL PROCESS 281 (Jill Hunter, Paul
Roberts, Simon N.M. Young & David Dixon eds., 2016).
31
See JACKSON & SUMMERS, supra note 4, at 50–51.
32
See id. at 51.
33
See id. at 31.
34
For example, in their role as “ministers of justice,” prosecutors in England and Wales
26
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Increasingly, however, this unitary conception of evidence law with its reliance
on the exclusion of particular kinds of unreliable evidence, no matter what context
they are sought to be admitted in, has been challenged—criminal trial defendants are
entitled to certain procedural rights which require that they are protected by special
evidentiary safeguards. The result is that some of the traditional common law rules
of evidence (for example, the rules on bad character and self-incrimination) have
been recast to give special protection to accused persons. Additionally, various
evidentiary devices such as compulsory process, legal professional privilege, the exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence, and the right of silence have been developed and elevated to the status of constitutional guarantees in many common law
(as well as civilian) jurisdictions.35
We thus see judges being required to engage more actively in trial fact finding
and in ensuring that defendants’ procedural, and in some cases, constitutional rights
are protected. These developments could be seen in common law jurisdictions before
the emergence of the “human rights revolution” that required states to commit
themselves to human rights instruments, such as the right to a fair trial, and in the
European context, before the ECtHR started to develop its jurisprudence, on fair trial
standards.36 But there is little doubt that the global human rights law that has emerged
has reinforced this trend. The ECtHR, for example, has emphasized the importance
of evidentiary rights in criminal proceedings through its development of rights such
as the presumption of innocence, the protection of the accused against abusive coercion, the right to examine witnesses, and the need for “equality of arms” and an
“adversarial proceeding” between the investigating or prosecuting authorities and
the accused.37 The question then is whether the ECtHR, in its development of these
fair trial standards, has had a tangible impact on the development of common law
evidence jurisprudence.
II. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM ARBITRATOR TO SUPERVISOR
From the beginning, the ECtHR emphasized that the right to a fair trial, embodied
in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), holds a prominent place in a democratic society and must be given a broad construction.38 However,
have long had greater duties to disclose evidence to the defense than the defense has had to disclose evidence to the prosecution. See DAVID CORKER & STEPHEN PARKINSON, DISCLOSURE
IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 2 (2009).
35
See Jackson & Roberts, supra note 5, at 789.
36
See generally Paul Roberts & Jill Hunter, Introduction—The Human Rights Revolution in
Criminal Evidence and Procedure, in CRIMINAL EVIDENCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (Paul
Roberts & Jill Hunter eds., 2012) (examining the impact of the “human rights revolution” on
criminal evidence and procedure law in common law jurisdictions).
37
See JACKSON & SUMMERS, supra note 4, at 347.
38
See Delcourt v. Belgium, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at paras. 21, 25 (1920).
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the ECtHR seemed particularly reluctant to be prescriptive when it came to evidentiary matters. A number of limiting principles have been adopted. First of all, from
its early days, the ECtHR established that the Strasbourg authorities did not constitute a further court of appeal from the national courts.39 This means that the court
will not interfere with the national courts’ evaluation of evidence, unless the evaluation “is found to be wholly arbitrary.”40 This is not a surprising stance for a human
rights body to take. In fact, it has been emulated by the UN Human Rights Committee
(UNHRC) which has held that it is generally the task of the national courts to review
facts and evidence and apply the domestic law in a particular case, unless it can be
shown that such an evaluation or application was clearly arbitrary or amounted to
a manifest error or denial of justice.41 As we shall see, however, the ECtHR seems
to be increasingly considering the reliability of the evidence in determining whether,
in individual instances, the applicant received a fair trial.
Second, in line with the general principle that the member states “enjoy considerable freedom in the choice of the appropriate means [of] ensur[ing] that their judicial
systems comply with the requirements of Article 6,”42 the ECtHR has considered
that rules on the admissibility of evidence are “primarily a matter for regulation under
national law.”43 It does not require member states to adopt the admissibility rules of
the common law system, but it equally does not interfere with the admissibility rules
of the common law system. The UNHRC has likewise held that “it is primarily for
the domestic legislatures of States’ parties to determine the admissibility of evidence
and how their courts assess it.”44
39

Kemmache v. France (No. 3), App. No. 17621/91, para. 44 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 24, 1994),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22fulltext%22: [%22\%22KEMMACHE%20v.%20FRANCE
\%22%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-57894%22]} [https://perma.cc/2MNS-R2RU]. See also
Santaella Telleria v. Venezuela, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 47/05, OEA /Ser.L/V/II
.124, doc. 5 para. 40 (2005), http://www.worldcourts.com/iacmhr/eng/decisions/2005.10.12
_Santaella_Telleria_v_Venezuela.pdf [https://perma.cc/5K5M-8DQG].
40
See Berhani v. Albania, App. No. 847/05, para. 50 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 27, 2010), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-98833 [https://perma.cc/2SJ4-A4X7]; Khamidov v. Russia, App.
No. 72118/01, para. 174 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 6, 2007), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-83273
[https://perma.cc/H226-UTR6].
41
Casado v. Spain, Communc’n No. 1399/2005, United Nations Human Rights Committee [UNHRC], para. 4.3 (July 25, 2005). See also Riedl-Riedenstein v. Germany, Communc’n
No. 1188/2003, United Nations Human Rights Committee [UNHRC], para. 7.3 (June 11, 2003),
http://juris.ohchr.org/Search/Details/1147 [https://perma.cc/D7JT-P73H]; Simms v. Jamaica,
Communc’n No. 541/1993, United Nations Committee [UNHRC] para. 6.2 (Apr. 3, 1995),
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/undocs/html/dec541.htm [https://perma.cc/RLJ6-LPS5].
42
Hadjianastassiou v. Greece 252 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16 (1992).
43
Schenk v. Switzerland, 140 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26 (1988); Delta v. France, App. No.
11444/85, para. 35 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 19, 1990), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22fulltext
%22:[%22delta%20v.%20france%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-57647%22]} [https://perma
.cc/D7Q7-9TZY].
44
U.N. Hum. Rts. Committee, General Comment No. 32: Right to Equality Before Courts
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Third, the European Commission and the ECtHR both stated at an early stage
that their task is to determine whether they can be satisfied that the proceedings taken
“as a whole” were fair.45 On the one hand, this has enabled the ECtHR to give an
expansive interpretation to Article 6, and to hold that the rights accorded to defendants in Article 6(2) and 6(3) are “specific [aspects] of the general principle stated
in paragraph 1” and are to be regarded as “a non-exhaustive list” of “minimum rights”
which form “constituent elements, amongst others, of the notion of a fair trial in criminal proceedings.”46 This expansionist principle has enabled the ECtHR to read other
important protective rights into Article 6, such as the privilege against self-incrimination.47 On the other hand, however, in a number of cases the ECtHR has considered that it is not essential for the specific rights to be respected in every case if the
trial, when examined as a whole, has been fair. For example, in Asch v. Austria,48 the
applicant was not given the opportunity to cross-examine the main witness in an apparent breach of the right to examine witnesses under Article 6(3)(d). The Court
decided, in spite of this, taken as a whole, the trial could not be characterized as
having been unfair.49 Sometimes the Court has adopted a stricter proportionality
analysis by considering if measures restricting the rights of the defense are “strictly
necessary” and there are adequate compensating measures taken to protect the accused
at trial.50 But the clear signal sent to domestic jurisdictions is that they may make
“inroads . . . into the specific rights [in Article 6(3)(d)], provided that the trial as a
whole may be considered fair.”51
While these limiting principles have enabled the Court to adopt a cautionary
approach toward the regulation of evidence in national courts, they have not prevented the Court from developing principles that it has considered to be at the heart
of a fair trial, such as the privilege against self-incrimination and the principles of
equality of arms and adversarial procedure.52 Inevitably, this meant that there would
and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, art. 14, para. 39, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32 (Aug. 23, 2017).
In its ninetieth session the Human Rights Committee replaced general comment 13, from its
thirty-first session.
45
Barberà v. Spain, 146 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 37–38 (1988); Delta, App. No. 11444/85,
Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 35. For criticism of the “fairness as a whole” doctrine, see STEFAN TRECHSEL,
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 87 (2005).
46
Deweer v. Belgium, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 30 (1980).
47
See, e.g., Funke v. France, 256 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 22 (1993).
48
See 203 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 10–11 (1991). This consideration of the ECtHR is contrary to what would seem to be required in the English text which refers to the specific rights
in Article 6(B) as “minimum rights.” Stefan Trechsel, The Character of the Right to a Fair Trial,
in OBSTACLES TO FAIRNESS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONAL FORMS 23 (John D. Jackson & Sarah J. Summers eds., 2018). See also Ryan Goss, Out
of Many, One? Strasbourg’s Ibrahim Decision on Article 6, 80 MOD. L. REV. 1137, 1146 (2017).
49
Asch, 203 Eur.Ct. H.R. at 6–8.
50
See Van Mechelen v. Netherlands, 1997-111 Eur. Ct. H.R. 691, 712.
51
JACKSON & SUMMERS, supra note 4, at 83.
52
See id.
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come a point when the development of such principles would conflict with taking
a ‘hands off’ approach toward the way national courts regulated evidence. Admittedly, when one looks across both common law and civil law systems, there is a great
deal of agreement on how certain types of evidence obtained by coercion should be
treated.53 Despite the ECtHR’s “mantra” that it is not its role to determine whether
particular types of evidence may be admissible or not, the Court has come to accept that
the use in criminal proceedings of evidence obtained by way of torture will automatically violate the right to a fair trial,54 as will the use of incriminating statements
obtained in defiance of the will of the accused.55 Such rules are quite in keeping with
the common law approach. The common law has long considered that statements
obtained by torture, threats, or inducements will automatically be inadmissible.56
Things became more controversial, however, when the ECtHR used the concepts
of equality of arms and adversarial procedure to develop a vision of defense rights as
not only protecting defendants from abuse and coercion but also enabling defendants
to fully participate in the trial process.57 Attention has focused on two of the minimum rights specified under Article 6(3): the right to counsel (Article 6(3)(c)), and
the right to examine witnesses (Article 6(3)(d)).58 In November 2008, the ECtHR
issued its famous judgment in Salduz v. Turkey, stating that suspects had a right of
access to a lawyer when first questioned by the police.59 Although there has been
much debate about what the nature of such access should mean,60 the prescription
that some access was required when suspects were first questioned by the police had
major repercussions across the member states of the Council of Europe.61 This
included common law systems such as Scotland, though less so England and Wales
where statutory legislation had already provided for a right of access to a lawyer in
53

See id. at 170.
Harutyunyan v. Armenia, 2007-111 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 21; Husayn v. Poland App. No.
7511/13, para. 554 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 24, 2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-146047
[https://perma.cc/YBY2-HKFE]; Levinta v. Moldova, App. No. 17332/03, para. 104 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. Dec. 16, 2008), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-90304 [https://perma.cc/JNE9-8RE2].
55
Saunders v. United Kingdom, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2044, 2064.
56
See A v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2005] UKHL 71, [2006] 2 AC 221, 228–29;
R v. Warickshall (1783) 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 235 (demonstrating the common law requirement
that confessions must be voluntary dates back to the eighteenth century).
57
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the police station.62 The evidential impact of the judgment had an effect on both of
these jurisdictions, however, by in effect imposing what seemed like an almost
blanket exclusionary rule on the use made of any incriminating statements when
access to a lawyer was denied, no matter how reliable such statements were or how
voluntarily they were made. This effectively fettered the discretion that judges had
hitherto exercised to decide for themselves whether voluntary or reliable statements
unfairly obtained should be excluded.63
The “sole or decisive” rule that was applied to unexamined witness evidence
proved even more controversial. As we have seen in cases like Asch v. Austria, the
Court first adopted a flexible approach toward the right to examine witnesses by looking for compensatory safeguards when defendants were not able to examine witnesses
against them.64 In later years, it developed a stricter approach toward the right.65 In
a number of cases, culminating in Al-Khawaja v. UK66 in 2009, the ECtHR considered that the right to examine witnesses in Article 6(1)(d) was an aspect of the right
to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 which, in principle, requires that all evidence
must be produced in the presence of the accused in a public hearing with a view to
adversarial argument.67 An almost absolute rule developed to the effect:
[T]hat where a conviction is based solely or to a decisive degree
on depositions that have been made by a person whom the accused has had no opportunity to examine or to have examined,
whether during the investigation or at the trial, the rights of the
defence are restricted to an extent that is incompatible with the
guarantees provided by Article 6.68
At first sight, it is hard to see why these particular Strasbourg rules should rub up
against the common law model of evidence. After all, exclusionary rules are very much
its hallmark. The common law has long had a rule excluding the use of involuntary
confessions and the Salduz rule excluding the use of incriminating statements made
in the absence of legal advice might seem little more than an extension of the
62
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privilege against self-incrimination long recognized in English law.69 Similarly,
rules such as the hearsay rule have long been designed to encourage witnesses to
give oral evidence at trial by effectively excluding out-of-court witness statements
adduced to prove the truth of the facts asserted.70 In fact, the Strasbourg rules, particularly the sole or decisive rule as applied to unexamined statements, have provided a challenge both to the common law method of excluding evidence and to the
increasingly flexible approach that English courts have toward exclusionary rules
such as the hearsay rule. We will examine the methodological challenge first before
considering the content of the new Strasbourg rules.
III. THE METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGE
We have seen that the common law model of evidence requires judges to rule
on the admissibility of evidence in a piecemeal, “atomistic” manner as the evidence
is adduced, rather than make sweeping assessments about the impact of the evidence
on the case as a whole.71 By contrast, the ECtHR has considered that a much more
“holistic” approach is called for by considering how decisive or substantial any “suspect” evidence is in relation to the case as a whole.72 This requires judges to make
some assessment of the strength of the other evidence against the accused, decisions
that judges are not used to doing in criminal trials involving juries. It is true that at the
end of the prosecution’s case judges have been traditionally asked to rule on whether
there is a case to answer, requiring them to consider whether on one possible view
of the facts there is evidence on which a jury could conclude the defendant is guilty.73
But the new rules would seem to call for a much more searching analysis of the
strength of the evidence as a whole. In its own terms, the sole or decisive rule governing the use made of unexamined statements requires a judgment to be made as
to whether such evidence is the sole or decisive evidence in the case as a whole.74 The
Salduz principle, as enunciated by the ECtHR, did not seem to call for such a judgment to be made.75 The court suggested that if incriminating statements were made
after there had been a denial of access to a lawyer, then the rights of the accused
were irretrievably prejudiced.76 However, as we shall see, in its later application of
the rule the ECtHR would seem to have changed tack. In considering whether the
lack of access affects the fairness of the proceedings as a whole, the court has put
particular emphasis on the quality and significance of the incriminating statements
in the context of the evidence as a whole.77
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The UK judges were quick to voice their concerns about the “sole or decisive” rule.
Soon after the ECtHR applied the “sole or decisive” rule to the UK in Al-Khawaja
v. UK, the UK Supreme Court delivered a seven-judge ruling in R v. Horncastle,78
raising concerns about the practicability of the test under the common law system.79
In the jury system, the judge will not know whether a piece of evidence is decisive or
not in the jury’s eyes, so it was suggested that the judge would have to rule inadmissible any witness statement capable of proving decisive.80 If “decisive” means capable
of making a difference between a finding of guilt and innocence, then this seemed
to point to all hearsay evidence being excluded.
When the fourth section decision in Al-Khawaja was referred to the Grand
Chamber, the ECtHR clarified that the word “decisive” should not be broadly construed to mean that almost all evidence would qualify as “decisive,” but should be
narrowly understood as indicating evidence of such significance or importance as
is likely to be determinative of the outcome of the case. 81 But the broader methodological challenge that the sole or decisive rule poses to the common law model is
that it re-engages the law of evidence in the logical analysis of evidence. The judge is
no longer required to apply a technical rule (hearsay) and its exceptions in a binary
fashion, determining whether the evidence is accordingly admissible or inadmissible.
Instead, he is required to make a wholesale, rounded assessment of the importance
of the evidence to the case as a whole. The jury, under judicial direction, must then
likewise make its own assessment of the evidence in this manner. This is a shift
towards the “forensic reasoning rules” that Roberts and Zuckerman have referred to,
as opposed to the conventional exclusionary rules of evidence at common law.82 In
contrast to the common law’s atomistic admissibility determinations (deferring holistic
evaluation of evidence to the jury), the ECtHR is requiring judges to engage in holistic
evaluation before the evidence gets to the jury.
Interestingly, however, the Grand Chamber defended the charge that the rule
could not be practically applied in the common law system on the ground that the
common law courts had themselves resorted to the very same sole or decisive rule
when they had considered whether anonymous witness evidence should be admissible in criminal trials.83 Rather than formulating a binary approach toward anonymous witness evidence whereby it was either admissible or not, the House of Lords
in R v. Davis84 had fashioned a rule (drawing, it would seem, from the language of
para. 191 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 16, 2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-148676 [https://
perma.cc/SZJ4-AC37].
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the ECtHR) that a conviction which was based solely, or to a decisive extent, on
statements or testimony of anonymous witnesses could not be regarded as “fair,”
adding that “[t]his [was] the view traditionally taken by the common law of England.”85 This case prompted the UK government to reverse the binding effect of such
a bright line rule by replacing it with legislation that allowed judges to make witness
anonymity orders.86 Interestingly, the effect of the rule was not wholly extinguished,
as one of the factors which judges were to regard in deciding to make an anonymity
order was “whether evidence given by the witness might be the sole or decisive evidence implicating the defendant.”87 The ECtHR also drew attention to another
context in which a “sole or decisive” rule had been incorporated into English law
relating to the drawing of adverse inferences from an accused’s silence. In Murray
v. United Kingdom,88 the Court had approved the drawing of inferences from accused persons in certain circumstances when the evidence against the accused called
for an explanation. However, it hedged this with various safeguards, one of which
was that it would be incompatible with the right of silence to base a conviction “solely
or mainly” on the accused’s failure to give evidence or on a refusal to answer questions put to him.89 The Court did not add, but seemed to rightly imply, that such a
rule had been successfully integrated into English law without much protest.90
Moreover, in the latest legislative attempt to codify hearsay law in the Criminal
Justice Act 2003, the UK Parliament began to shift the moorings of hearsay law
away from a purely exclusionary or inclusionary approach by empowering the trial
judge, at the end of the prosecution’s case, to direct an acquittal where he or she is
satisfied that:
[T]he case against the defendant is based wholly or partly on a
statement not made in oral evidence in the proceedings, and the
evidence provided by the statement is so unconvincing that,
considering its importance to the case against the defendant, his
conviction of the offence would be unsafe . . . .91
Rather than pointing to the impracticality of applying the sole or decisive rule
in the common law context, these shifts away from a purely exclusionary approach
toward adopting a more holistic approach of “suspect” evidence indicate that such
a rule could be successfully integrated into English law. This has produced a far
85
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more harmonic convergence than was suggested as possible in the Horncastle decision
between the common law as it has been developing in more recent years and the
human rights approach.92 The challenge that the “sole or decisive” rule posed to the
more flexible approach regarding the admissibility of hearsay developed in the
Criminal Justice Act 2003 was more serious.
IV. THE FAIR PARTICIPATION CHALLENGE
The more substantive challenge that the new Strasbourg rules posed to the common law approach was how they appeared to elevate considerations of fair participation in the proceedings above the traditional considerations of truth-finding that had
long provided a motivating factor for rules governing confessions and hearsay. The
common law, as we have seen, had always accepted that involuntary confessions
were inadmissible. The new Salduz doctrine now prescribed that any use of incriminating statements for a conviction when made during police interrogation without
access to a lawyer would, in principle, prejudice the rights of the defense, even when,
presumably, it is believed that the statements are reliable and voluntary.93 Furthermore,
the Court suggested that this would be the case even where, as the Court conceded,
there could be compelling reasons for not granting access to a lawyer.94 This
suggested that the right of access to a lawyer is grounded in more than simply the
privilege against self-incrimination, long embedded as a principle within the common law.95 In justification of its rule, the ECtHR stated that access to a lawyer would
help ensure the right of an accused not to incriminate himself.96 Such a right presupposed that the prosecution in a criminal case must seek to prove their case without
resorting to evidence obtained through methods of coercion or oppression. But the
Court also seemed to extend its justification for access to a lawyer on the broader,
more participative principle of equality of arms between the investigating or prosecuting authorities and the accused.97 In later judgments, the ECtHR expressly linked
the Salduz doctrine to the need to secure “the fundamental aspects of . . . [the]
defence” such as the “discussion of the case, organisation of the defence, collection
of evidence favorable to the accused, preparation for questioning, support of an
accused in distress and checking of the conditions of detention.”98
This participative strand to the fair trial standards is also very evident in the
“sole or decisive” rule relating to unexamined statements which, in Al-Khawaja, was
92
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applied even where there was a good reason for the non-attendance of the witness.99
The common law has long recognized the importance of the defendant being able to
confront his accusers and cross-examine them.100 Indeed, the “sole or decisive” rule
relating to anonymous statements articulated by the House of Lords in Davis gave
particular expression to the content of these principles.101 However, there has also been
a strong reliability strain built into the common law, reinforced by the statutory provisions relating to hearsay in the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which has allowed the
admittance of hearsay when it is reliable or is the best evidence available.102 Before
Al-Khawaja’s case was determined in Strasbourg, the English Court of Appeal had
stressed that where a witness who is the sole witness of a crime has made a statement to the police, and that witness has since died (as happened in Al-Khawaja),
there may be a strong public interest in the admission of the statement as evidence
so that the prosecution may proceed.103 This did not mean that such a statement
would automatically be admissible. There was a provision under the legislation for
the judge to exclude the statement if he considered it had insufficient value.104
Additionally, as we have seen, there is a provision to direct an acquittal where reliance
on such a statement would make a conviction unsafe.105 When the case came to
Strasbourg, however, the Court in its fourth section decision ruled that the use of
such a statement constituted a violation of Article 6(1) and Article 6(3)(d) of the
Convention.106 The Court could envisage no counterbalancing factors that would justify
the introduction into evidence of an untested statement which was the sole or decisive
basis for the conviction of an applicant, other than in an exceptional case where the
witness had been kept from giving evidence through fear induced by the defendant.107
For the justices of the UK Supreme Court in Horncastle, this went too far.108
According to Lord Phillips, who gave the unanimous judgment of the Court, AlKhawaja was the first case where the sole or decisive test “had been applied so as
to produce a finding of a violation of Article 6(1)(3)(d) . . . where there had been justification for not calling a witness and where the evidence was demonstrably reliable.”109 This was also the first instance where the rule was applied in a case from
England and Wales and no consideration had been given as to whether it was necessary
or appropriate to apply the rule taking into account the safeguards contained in the
99
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Criminal Justice Act.110 His lordship considered that the justification for the sole or
decisive test appeared to be that the risk of an unsafe conviction based solely or decisively on anonymous or hearsay evidence was so great that such a conviction could
never be permitted.111 But by building in safeguards, the Criminal Justice Act had
shown that there were less draconian ways of protecting against that risk.112 His lordship’s preoccupation was very much about ensuring the reliability of the evidence.113
Earlier, his lordship indicated that there are two principal objectives of a fair criminal
trial—that a defendant who is innocent should be acquitted, and that a defendant
who is guilty should be convicted.114 He stated that the first objective carries more
weight than the second, but the emphasis placed on these objectives highlights that
a clear priority should be given to epistemic concerns in criminal trials.115 On this
view, the right to cross-examination is not sacrosanct; instead, everything turns on
the presumptive reliability of the statements made by witnesses.
What this view fails to encapsulate, however, is that a fair verdict is more than
simply a reliable verdict.116 The sole or decisive rule as applied to unexamined statements may be justified on a participatory, rather than on a purely epistemic basis, which
holds that witnesses put forward by either party must be capable of being effectively
tested by the other. The more a case rests upon witness statements in respect of whom
there is an absence of supporting evidence, the more it can be said that fairness requires that there should be an opportunity to examine these witnesses. The point is
not that the witness needs to be examined to determine whether his or her evidence
is reliable. The question is rather whether, as a matter of fairness, the defense ought
to be given an opportunity to put a version of events directly to an important witness
which is different from that advanced by the prosecution. If the prosecution has been
able to question a witness and rely on a statement which is clearly incriminatory,
why should the defense not be able to probe the witness who made it? Institutional
equality between the parties, in order that the tribunal of fact can reach an impartial
evaluation of the evidence, would seem to demand this.
Unfortunately, however, the strong claims that the Strasbourg rules in Salduz and
Al-Khawaja seemed to make for meaningful defense participation in both the investigatory and trial processes have since been rolled back by the ECtHR. Rather, the
ECtHR favors what would seem to be the classic common law concern for the reliability of the verdict, with fairness relegated as a mere side-constraint to ensuring that
defendants are fairly treated in the criminal justice process and not coerced into making
110
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involuntary statements.117 It did not take long for this rolling back to begin. When the
UK government asked for the fourth section decision in Al-Khawaja to be referred to
the Grand Chamber, the latter issued a decision which turned the “sole or decisive”
rule into more of a flexible standard. This restored a strong reliability rationale into the
Court’s decision-making and reaffirmed the dominance of the common law approach.118
V. STRASBOURG ROLLS BACK ITS OWN RULES
Much of the language in the Grand Chamber’s decision in Al-Khawaja expresses
a strong determination to uphold the sole or decisive rule.119 The UK based its challenge to the rule on the Supreme Court judgment in Horncastle.120 It argued that the
rule seemed to have been particularly directed at civil law jurisdictions which had not
accommodated the right to examination as comprehensively as common law jurisdictions.121 Common law countries had, by contrast, long developed a hearsay rule
which addressed that aspect of fair trials that Article 6(3)(d) of the ECtHR was
designed to ensure.122 The Grand Chamber accepted that much of the impact of
Article 6(3)(d) was on continental procedures which previously allowed the accused
to be convicted on the basis of evidence from witnesses whom he or she had not had
an opportunity to challenge.123 However, the cases of Al-Khawaja, where the accused
had been convicted on hearsay evidence, would not have arisen if the strict common
law rule against hearsay had been applied and the Criminal Justice Act had not provided
for exceptions which allowed the admission of witness statements.124 While it was important for the Court to have regard for substantial differences in legal systems and procedures, it had to apply the same standard of review under Article 6(1) and (3)(d)
irrespective of the legal system from which a case emanates.125 As we have seen, the
Court similarly rejected the argument that the rule could not be applied within the common law system.126
When it came to consider the substance of the rule, however, we see the Court
coming to a gradual acceptance of the “reliability” approach that was adopted in
Horncastle, which has arguably fatally undermined the right to examine witnesses.127
The Court rejected the UK government’s submission that the rule was predicated on
the false assumption that all hearsay evidence crucial to a case is either unreliable
117
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or incapable of proper assessment.128 Instead, the Court said it is predicated on the
principle that the greater the importance of the evidence, the greater the potential
unfairness to the defendant in allowing a witness to remain anonymous or absent
from the trial.129 So far, so good. But it then conceded that the rule is based largely on
a reliability rationale; where there was such potential unfairness, there was a greater
need for “safeguards to ensure that the evidence is demonstrably reliable or that its
reliability can properly be tested and assessed.”130 It then went on to undercut the
significance of the right to examine witnesses under Article 6(3)(d) by stating that
it has always “traditionally” interpreted Article 6(3) in the context of an overall examination of the fairness of the proceedings.131 Directing itself specifically to the sole
or decisive rule, it stated that it should not be applied in an inflexible manner.132
Seemingly reining back from its earlier statement about the need to apply objective
standards across all the member states, it considered that it would not be correct to
ignore entirely the specificities of the particular legal system concerned, particularly
its rules of evidence133:
To do so would transform the rule into a blunt and indiscriminate
instrument that runs counter to the traditional way in which the
Court approaches the issue of the overall fairness of the proceedings, namely to weigh in the balance the competing interests of
the defence, the victim, and witnesses, and the public interest in
the effective administration of justice.134
Far from introducing a more flexible element into the rule, however, it seemed
then to take the bite out of the rule altogether—“where a conviction is based solely
or decisively on the evidence of absent witnesses,” this was now only one important
factor to be balanced in the scales.135 The question in each case was whether there
were “sufficient counterbalancing factors in place,” including strong procedural
safeguards, to “permit a fair and proper assessment of the reliability of that evidence
to take place” so that a conviction based on such evidence would only be permitted
where it was sufficiently reliable given its importance to the case.136
When the Court came to apply these principles, it ironically seemed to come close
to appropriating for itself a fourth instance role, something it has always said it would
not do, by looking not only for strong procedural safeguards but also by making an
128
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overall assessment of the reliability of the evidence.137 The Court first looked at the
safeguards in the English legislation that enabled judges to prevent juries from considering sole or decisive witness statements, even though convictions may be based on
such statements, and considered that they were in principle strong safeguards to ensure
fairness.138 It then looked at the facts of the particular cases before it and considered
whether there was corroborative evidence to establish the reliability of the hearsay.139
The Court ruled that in the Al-Khawaja case, involving the statement of a deceased witness, there was, but that in the Tahery case, involving the statement of a witness in fear,
there was not.140 The counterbalancing factors that were considered, in other words,
were not only whether there were procedural safeguards assisting the defense to overcome the inability to examine the witnesses, but also evidential considerations such as
the strength of any corroborating evidence. In subsequent cases the ECtHR has taken
a similar approach, determining whether the proceedings were fair overall according to
whether there was or was not “strong corroborative evidence,” or in some cases determining whether the witness evidence was sole or decisive evidence in the first place.141
The most recent Grand Chamber decision in Schatschaschwili v. Germany142 on
the non-attendance of important witnesses seems to accentuate this trend toward
examining the reliability of the evidence and diminishing the importance of defense
participation in terms of being able to examine witnesses. In this case, the ECtHR
considered that the lack of a good reason for the non-attendance of a witness did not
in itself violate the accused’s right to a fair trial.143 In Al-Khawaja, the Court had
said that the requirement that there be a good reason for admitting the evidence of
an absent witness was a preliminary question to be examined before any consideration of whether that evidence was sole or decisive.144 In a number of decisions
before Al-Khawaja, the Court had found that even where the evidence of an absent
witness had not been sole or decisive, there was a violation of Article 6(1) and 3(d)
when no good reasons had been shown for failing to have the witness examined.145
In Schatschaschwili, however, the Grand Chamber found that even though there were
good reasons why two decisive witnesses could not attend, the absence of a good reason
137
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for the non-attendance of a witness was not itself conclusive of the unfairness of a
trial.146 Following the approach adopted in Al-Khawaja, the Grand Chamber stated:
[i]t would amount to the creation of a new indiscriminate rule if
a trial were considered to be unfair for lack of a good reason for
a witness’s non-attendance alone, even if the untested evidence
was neither sole nor decisive and was possibly even irrelevant
for the outcome of the case.147
Although the Court noted that the lack of a good reason for a prosecution
witness’s absence was a “very” important factor to be considered when assessing the
overall fairness of the proceedings,148 the extent to which the Court is prepared to
tolerate the non-attendance of an important (if not decisive) witness for no good
reason, thereby depriving the defense of an opportunity to cross-examine the witness, can be illustrated in Seton v. UK.149 In this case, the English Court of Appeal
upheld a judge’s decision to admit, under the Criminal Justice Act, the hearsay
evidence of a phone call by a serving prisoner in which he denied responsibility for
a murder which the defendant alleged that he had committed.150 The prisoner had
refused to give a statement to the police or to testify.151 In its decision, the fourth
section of the ECtHR considered that there was no good reason for the non-attendance of the witness (he could have been compelled to attend), but nevertheless
found there had been no violation of Article 6 as there was other “substantial, even
decisive, incriminating evidence” against the defendant.152 The case serves as a
classic illustration of how the apparent reliability of the rest of the evidence was
deemed to make the proceedings as a whole fair, thereby aligning reliability of the
evidence very closely with fairness.
The reiteration of the traditional approach of looking at the overall fairness of
the proceedings has also come into play in the Court’s more recent interpretation of
the Salduz rule. In Ibrahim v. United Kingdom,153 the ECtHR introduced a two-tier
146
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test considering whether restricting the Salduz right of access to a lawyer violated
a fair trial.154 The first question was “whether there were compelling reasons for the
restriction of access” and the second question was whether the restriction had an impact on “the overall fairness of the proceedings.”155 The rigor of the Salduz doctrine
rule seemed to be diluted here in two respects.156 First of all, in Salduz, the Court had
accepted that there could be compelling reasons for the restriction of access but
considered that where there were not, Article 6 required that “as a rule” access be
provided.157 The question left unanswered was what meaning to give to “as a rule.”158
Was it to be interpreted to mean that where there were not compelling reasons for
the restriction, there would be an automatic breach of Article 6 as the Court intended? Or did it mean only that where there were no compelling reasons, there
would be merely a presumption of unfairness and that the Court could proceed in
the traditional manner to consider whether the proceedings as a whole were fair? In
Ibrahim, the Court was satisfied that there were compelling reasons for restricting
access to three of the applicants given the urgent need to question them about the
whereabouts of bombs which it was feared they had planted in the London underground.159 But then, paralleling its stance in Schatschaschwili where the Court said
that the absence of good reasons for the non-attendance of a witness would not
necessarily violate a fair trial,160 the Court took the view that the absence of compelling reasons similarly does not necessarily violate a fair trial.161 Instead, in such a
case, there was a presumption of unfairness for the government to rebut.162
A good illustration of how this can dilute the rigor of the Salduz rule can be seen
in a later Grand Chamber case on the interpretation of the Salduz rule, Simeonovi v.
Bulgaria.163 The Court found—by twelve votes to five—that despite the absence of
compelling reasons for restricting the applicant’s access to legal assistance while he
had been in custody, the government had rebutted unfairness by showing that he had
not been prejudiced by this restriction.164 The applicant’s right to legal assistance
154
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had been restricted for the first three days of his police custody.165 He had then made
a voluntary confession two weeks later in the presence of a lawyer.166 The Court said
that no causal link was ever posited between the absence of a lawyer for the first
three days of custody and the confession that was used, amongst other evidence, to
convict him.167 The Court found that although there had not been compelling reasons
for restricting his right of access to a lawyer, the fairness of the proceedings, taken
as a whole, had not been irretrievably prejudiced by the absence of legal assistance
while he had been in police custody.168 According to the latest Grand Chamber
decision on the interpretation of the Salduz rule, it is necessary to adopt a two-tiered
approach and consider “fairness as a whole,” even where there is a mandatory restriction on suspects in police custody communicating with a lawyer for which there
could be no compelling reason.169
The second respect in which the Salduz rule seemed to be diluted in Ibrahim
relates to what is meant by the fairness of the proceedings. In Salduz, as we have
seen, fairness seemed to be equated with not unduly prejudicing the rights of the
accused under Article 6 even when there were compelling reasons for restricting the
right of access.170 Such rights were considered to be irretrievably prejudiced when
incriminating statements were made in the absence of a lawyer.171 In Ibrahim, a
somewhat different approach was taken to fairness.172 The decision was made in the
context of a case where the applicants had been convicted of conspiracy to murder
for detonating bombs which failed to explode on three underground trains and a bus
in central London—two weeks after four suicide bombs exploded on three underground trains and a bus, killing fifty-two people and injuring hundreds more.173 The
Court considered that there could “be no question of watering down fair trial rights
for the sole reason that the individuals in question [were] suspected of involvement
in terrorism.”174 But then, in the very next sentence it appeared to contradict itself:
“when determining whether the proceedings as a whole have been fair[,] the weight
of the public interest in the investigation and punishment of the particular offence
in issue may be taken into consideration,” provided “the very essence of an applicant’s defense rights” is not extinguished.175 This balancing of the individual defense
165
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rights against the public interest seemed then to lead the Court, as it had done previously in Al-Khawaja, toward putting a high premium on the weight or reliability of
the evidence against the defendant when considering the fairness of the proceedings as
a whole.176 In setting out a number of relevant factors to be considered, the Court put
considerable emphasis on the quality and significance of the evidence in the context
of the evidence as a whole.177 The Court appeared to be suggesting that, “[t]he more
important the evidence in the context of the prosecution case, the more vulnerable
the suspect and the greater the risk of unreliability, the greater the impact will be on the
fairness of the proceedings.”178 On the facts of the case, the Court considered that the
three applicants who had lied to the police when questioned in the absence of a lawyer
had had these lies admitted as evidence against them as merely one element of a substantial prosecution case and in their cases, it was satisfied that the proceedings as a
whole were fair.179 By contrast, the admissions which the fourth applicant had made
had formed an integral and significant part of the evidence on which his conviction
was based, and the Court considered that in his case the proceedings were unfair.180
In both respects in which it can be argued that the Salduz rule was diluted in
Ibrahim, it is troubling that, like the watering down of the “sole or decisive” rule as
applied to unexamined statements, the ECtHR has shifted the emphasis away from
defense rights and put greater reliance on balancing these against the public interest
in ensuring that the guilty are punished. It is true that in Ibrahim the Court emphasized
that public interest concerns cannot extinguish “the very essence” of an applicant’s
rights.181 But if these rights can be overridden in the interests of an overall fairness
test that puts a heavy weight on the reliability of the evidence as a whole, it is hard
to see how their essence is not taken away.182 As the dissent makes clear, “there is
no logically compelling ground to claim that only an ‘overall fairness’ evaluation
(based on the outcome of the trial) can result in a finding of a violation of Article
6.”183 When one looks at the history of the Court’s case law, there was nothing unique
in the Salduz approach of considering a specific factor to be so decisive to the fairness
of the proceedings as to enable the fairness of the whole trial to be assessed.184 In
both ways: Article 6 rights cannot be watered down when a particularly serious offense has
been committed but the rights can be “balanced away” when terrorism is concerned).
176
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other words, violations of certain bright line rules are so prejudicial per se to the overall fairness of the proceedings that there is no need to make any further assessment.
Instead, the ECtHR would seem to have adopted the common law approach of giving
weight to the reliability of evidence and the outcome of the trial over defense rights,
without realizing that a harmonic convergence between truth-finding and fairness
requires that these two considerations are not put in opposition. In the interests of the
overall integrity of the proceedings, truth-finding is only achieved through fairness.
CONCLUSION—THE COMMON LAW VINDICATED OR REIMAGINED?
In earlier Parts of this Article, we have reviewed how in recent jurisprudence of the
ECtHR, through the development of strong principles like the Salduz rule and the “sole
or decisive” rule, common law judges have been encouraged to shift away from atomistic approaches toward more holistic approaches to factual reasoning, and to shift
away from the common law emphasis on truth-finding, where fairness is considered to
be a mere side-constraint on the overall search for rectitude. It is true that there were
already signs of these shifts occurring, as judges have come to grapple more with
“forensic reasoning rules” and with the importance of procedural rights.185 But the
emphasis of the ECtHR on defense participation as a vital element of a fair trial, at
both investigatory and trial processes, has been a distinctive contribution that has encouraged a shift away from purely protective rights towards more participatory rights.186
More recently, however, the ECtHR has taken some of the bite out of its participatory
rules by equating fairness of the proceedings as a whole with whether there has been
a fair (reliable) outcome.187 This might seem to be a vindication of the traditional
common law approach and has led to a more harmonic convergence between common
law evidence and human rights law. But in another sense it has set back the potential
for a harmonic convergence between truth and fairness, where each goal is achieved
through procedures that allow for meaningful participation between the parties.
It would be wrong to end on too negative a note. The ECtHR continues to play
a useful role in giving an independent voice to important principles which have the
potential to influence the development of the common law of evidence and push it
in the direction of a more harmonic convergence of principles. This can be illustrated
by looking at two more positive features of the recent Grand Chamber decisions in
Schatschaschwili and Ibrahim.188 Although we have seen that the Schatschaschwili
decision gave priority to the “fairness as a whole” principle when there has been no
good reason for the non-attendance of witnesses, it went on to give a majority
decision that has potentially wide-ranging significance for common law evidence.189
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The Court concluded that on the facts of the case the evidence of the two witnesses
was decisive in the determination of the applicant’s conviction.190 The trial court had
scrutinized the reliability of their statements in a careful manner but hardly any
procedural measures had been taken to compensate for the defense’s lack of opportunity to directly cross-examine the witnesses.191 In particular, the Court pointed to
the failure to provide for any defense examination of the witnesses at the investigation stage when the investigating judge had heard the witnesses.192 Overall, the
ECtHR concluded that given the importance of the statements, the counterbalancing
measures had been insufficient to permit a fair and proper assessment of the reliability of the untested evidence.193
This reassertion of the importance of procedural measures to compensate for the
absence of examination at trial is a welcome expression of the continuing importance
of providing some measure of defense participation other than giving the defendant
an opportunity simply to give his own version of the facts. Salduz heralded an important change in terms of the participation of defense counsel at the investigative
stage of police questioning of suspects. Now, it would seem that Schatschaschwili
is exhorting member states to build in mechanisms for the participation of the defense
at the investigatory stage of questioning witnesses as well.194 It has repercussions,
however, for the common law model of evidence which has traditionally focused on
the principle of defense participation at trial. Although it would seem that common law
systems have adjusted to the Salduz principle, the notion that counsel should have
a role in questioning witnesses who are likely to be absent at trial is a new challenge.
The other example of the ECtHR’s role in encouraging states to comply with
principle is seen in the Ibrahim decision.195 We have seen that the Court considered
that there were compelling reasons to restrict access to legal advice to three of the
four applicants based on the urgency of the situation.196 This was another respect in
which the Court’s judgment referred to the need to balance rights against the public
interest.197 When it came to the fourth applicant, it found there were not compelling
reasons to restrict access here, because the police had acted completely outside the
framework of domestic law.198 In particular, they failed to caution him at the point
when it became clear he was no longer only a witness, but was about to incriminate
himself; this was a deliberate flouting of the code of practice governing the detention
190
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and questioning of suspects.199 A significant minority of judges considered that it is
hard to understand why, if the urgent factual circumstances were enough to constitute compelling reasons to restrict access to the first three applicants, these were not
enough to constitute compelling reasons in respect of the fourth applicant.200 The
minority thought that breaches of the code of practice should have been considered
at the second stage of the test when examining the fairness of the proceedings as a
whole, particularly as the Court mentioned that one factor to account for was whether
the framework governing pretrial proceedings and the admission of evidence had been
complied with.201 The minority considered that because the trial judge had discretion
to exclude the evidence when there had been breaches of the code, this meant there
had been sufficient compliance with the rule of law.202 But this overlooks the need
for a human rights court to be seen affirming the rule of law. Here, there was no
mere technical breach of the code; there was a deliberate flouting of the whole basis
underlying the questioning of suspects which the trial judge failed to consider when
exercising his discretion to admit the statement.
The common law has long subscribed to principles such as a right to a fair trial
and the rule of law. As we have seen, however, the common law model of evidence
tended to give priority to the weight or probative value of the evidence in any particular case, although it has upheld protective principles such as the need to protect
defendants against abuse and compelled incrimination. The ECtHR’s wider agenda
of introducing participatory principles into the forensic process has challenged this
approach. Although the Court has rolled back somewhat from imposing these principles on member states by making it clear that it will always look at the fairness of
the proceedings as a whole, recent decisions show that this does not mean that the
Court will always give overwhelming weight to the fairness or reliability of the outcome of a case. Instead, the Court will wish to ensure that counterbalancing procedures
have been taken to try and accommodate participatory principles and that ultimately
there has been respect for the rule of law in the procedures that have been followed.
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